Year 2010 Issues on Cryptographic Algorithms by Masashi Une & Masayuki Kanda
129
Year 2010 Issues on 
Cryptographic Algorithms
Masashi Une and Masayuki Kanda
In the financial sector, cryptographic algorithms are used as fundamental techniques 
for assuring confidentiality and integrity of data used in financial transactions and 
for authenticating entities involved in the transactions. Currently, the most widely 
used algorithms appear to be two-key triple DES and RC4 for symmetric ciphers, RSA
with a 1024-bit key for an asymmetric cipher and a digital signature, and SHA-1 
for a hash function according to international standards and guidelines related to the
financial transactions.
However, according to academic papers and reports regarding the security evaluation
for such algorithms, it is difficult to ensure enough security by using the algorithms for 
a long time period, such as 10 or 15 years, due to advances in cryptanalysis techniques,
improvement of computing power, and so on. To enhance the transition to more secure
ones, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of the United States
describes in various guidelines that NIST will no longer approve two-key triple DES,
RSA with a 1024-bit key, and SHA-1 as the algorithms suitable for IT systems of the
U.S. Federal Government after 2010.
It is an important issue how to advance the transition of the algorithms in the financial
sector. This paper refers to issues regarding the transition as Year 2010 issues in cryptographic
algorithms. To successfully complete the transition by 2010, the deadline set by NIST, it is
necessary for financial institutions to begin discussing the issues at the earliest possible date.
This paper summarizes security evaluation results of the current algorithms, and
describes Year 2010 issues, their impact on the financial industry, and the transition plan
announced by NIST. This paper also shows several points to be discussed when dealing
with Year 2010 issues.
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Cryptographic algorithms are widely used in the financial sector to ensure security in
various financial transactions. For instance, the algorithms are used to ensure confi-
dentiality and integrity of data such as a personal identification number (PIN) and an
account number in automated teller machine (ATM) transactions. The algorithms are
also used to authenticate counterparties of the transactions in Internet banking 
services. In general, symmetric ciphers are adopted to ensure confidentiality. To ensure
integrity and authenticity, a message authentication code (MAC) based on symmetric
ciphers or a digital signature based on asymmetric ciphers is adopted.
To determine which algorithms are currently mainstream, we can refer to inter-
national standards and guidelines regarding security techniques in the financial sector.
The representative standards and guidelines are developed and maintained by
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). It is likely that many financial
institutions take security measures in accordance with the ISO standards. For instance,
ISO 9564-2 (ISO [2005a]), the international standard for PIN encipherment for 
financial transactions, specifies triple DES as an encryption algorithm for the PIN and
also specifies RSA as a key transport scheme for a triple DES session key. ISO 11568-2
(ISO [2005b]), the international standard for key management for asymmetric ciphers,
specifies several algorithms using SHA-1 as a hash function. As for triple DES, two-key
triple DES, which uses two different keys, appears to be the most widely used. RSA
with a 1024-bit key (referred to as 1024-bit RSA hereafter) appears to be the most
widely used among asymmetric ciphers. 
To ensure the security of financial services provided through the Internet, the
financial institutions use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS)
specified by International Engineering Task Force (IETF). IETF develops and main-
tains international standards regarding information techniques used on the Internet.
RC4 specified in SSL version 3.0/TLS version 1.0 also appears to be widely used as a
symmetric cipher to assure the confidentiality of the transaction data in Internet
banking systems.
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) of the United States 
has approved two-key triple DES, 1024-bit RSA, and SHA-1 as cryptographic algo-
rithms suitable for IT systems of the U.S. Federal Government. However, NIST 
indicated that it will no longer approve these algorithms after 2010. NIST is granted
the authority for information security measures for the U.S. Federal Government 
through various acts and orders. In May 2004, NIST indicated in SP800-67
(Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher)
1
that it will no longer approve two-key triple DES. In August 2005, NIST indicated 
in SP800-57 (Recommendation on Key Management)
2 that it will no longer approve
1024-bit RSA. As for SHA-1, in August 2004, NIST also announced to phase out
SHA-1 by the end of 2010 (NIST [2004a]). As for RC4, NIST has never approved 
or recommended it.
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1. See NIST (2004b).
2. See NIST (2005a).We can consider the following two reasons for NIST’s decision. The first is the
decline of security levels of the conventional algorithms developed in the mid-1990s
or before due to recent advances such as progress of cryptanalysis and distributed
computation techniques, improvement of computation power, and so on. The results
of academic security evaluations of the algorithms indicate that they will not be able
to provide adequate security within 10 to 15 years. For instance, it was demonstrated
that a 663-bit composite number could be factorized practically as of 2005 and 
a 911-bit special composite number was also factorized in 2006. With regard to the
hash function, Chinese cryptographers have proposed a new and strong method that
could find an SHA-1 collision (a pair of different input values which produce the
same hash value) more efficiently than the birthday attack.
3
The second is that there exist new algorithms and enhancement to conventional
algorithms which provide higher security (and processing speed) than the conven-
tional ones. After NIST’s solicitation and selection of the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), similar activities were taken in Europe and in Japan. In Europe, the
New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption (NESSIE) project
has undertaken a solicitation and selection of recommended cryptographic algorithms
(hereafter referred to as NESSIE-recommended cryptographic algorithms).
4 In Japan,
the Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees (CRYPTREC) evaluated
cryptographic algorithms and compiled the e-Government Recommended Ciphers
List.
5 Referring to these evaluation results, ISO developed ISO/IEC 18033, an inter-
national standard for encryption algorithms, for the first time.
6 These evaluations 
and the international standard help the financial institutions select next-generation
algorithms that offer reliable security.
NIST approval of cryptographic algorithms has served in many fields, including
the financial sector, as a guarantee for the security of the corresponding algorithms.
For instance, DES became the de facto and de jure international standard for a 
symmetric cipher after NIST approved DES as FIPS 46 (Data Encryption Algorithm)
in 1977. The NIST guarantee for the current mainstream algorithms will cease 
to apply after 2010 according to information disclosed by NIST. Therefore, it is
required to transit to the new algorithms that have been evaluated as sufficiently
secure for a long-term period to maintain the security and reliability of IT systems 
in the finance sector. Since such a transition will make each financial institution
update its IT systems, it will also be necessary to consider how to ensure compatibility
among IT systems at different financial institutions. We can imagine that such 
consideration necessitates consensus-building in the financial industry, as well as 
an adequate preparatory period. In addition, it will take certain costs to update 
the systems.
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3. The birthday attack is a basic method of finding a collision on the basis of the birthday paradox. The birthday 
paradox refers to the fact that the probability of at least two people having the same birthday in a group consisting
of 23 people exceeds 0.5.
4. See NESSIE Consortium (2003).
5. See MIAC and METI (2003).
6. See ISO and IEC (2005a, b, c).It is therefore a critical issue to study the optimal approach to completing a
smooth, rapid transition of cryptographic algorithms without damaging the security
and reliability of IT systems. This paper collectively refers to problems associated 
with the transition of cryptographic algorithms toward 2010 as Year 2010 issues in
cryptographic algorithms (hereafter simply “Year 2010 issues”).
When financial institutions address Year 2010 issues, the first problem is selecting
appropriate algorithms. This selection differs from past transitions from DES to triple
DES. More secure algorithms have already been recommended by public organiza-
tions in addition to NIST. For instance, CRYPTREC has published the e-Government
Recommended Ciphers List, and NESSIE has published NESSIE-recommended cryp-
tographic algorithms.
7 ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 has standardized ISO/IEC 18033 on the
basis of these recommendations. It is desirable for the financial institutions to select
new algorithms by referring to these evaluation results and the international standard.
There are also medium- to long-term issues to be discussed. To immediately 
and appropriately deal with the problems regarding compromise of cryptographic
algorithms such as the Year 2010 issues, it is necessary to follow the latest security 
evaluations of the algorithms and establish systems to monitor the actions of NIST and
other organizations. Financial institutions should also discuss how to design and
implement IT systems that can smoothly accommodate changes in cryptographic 
algorithms and in key lengths.
This paper provides information that will aid financial institutions in examining
Year 2010 issues. Section II summarizes the cryptographic algorithms currently used by
financial institutions, focusing on the international standards and guidelines. Section
III summarizes current security evaluation results for the cryptographic algorithms
described in Section II. Section IV discusses NIST policies concerning the transition
of the cryptographic algorithms and potential effects of Year 2010 issues. Section V
introduces cryptographic algorithms such as those specified in ISO/IEC 18033, those
approved or recommended by NIST, and those recommended by CRYPTREC or
NESSIE, with the goal of determining which cryptographic algorithms should be
selected, and discusses various issues to be considered when selecting cryptographic
algorithms and when moving to the selected new cryptographic algorithms, and the
problems that financial institutions will need to address with respect to compromise of
cryptographic algorithms. Section VI reviews the importance of appropriate responses
for the Year 2010 issues and summarizes this paper.
II. Current Mainstream Cryptographic Algorithms
In this section, we will summarize cryptographic algorithms used in the financial 
sector. We focus on the algorithms specified in international standards and guide-
lines related to the financial transactions, as well as on those specified in the IETF
Internet standards.
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7. See Table 10 in Section V.A.A. Cryptographic Algorithms Specified or Described in International Standards
and Guidelines
In most cases, for security reasons, financial institutions do not disclose the crypto-
graphic algorithms used in their networks and IT systems. For this reason, we refer to
the international standards and guidelines maintained by ISO/TC68, which is
responsible for the development and management of international standards for infor-
mation security techniques in the financial sector. Table 1 summarizes the algorithms
that are specified or described in these standards and guidelines.
Table 1 clearly shows that triple DES is the most widely used symmetric cipher.
ISO 9564-1 (ISO [2002a]) specifies that the key length should be at least 112 bits. No
other standards or guidelines explicitly restrict descriptions to two-key triple DES, but
133
Year 2010 Issues on Cryptographic Algorithms
Table 1  Cryptographic Algorithms Specified in ISO/TC68 International Standards
International standards  Symmetric ciphers Asymmetric ciphers Hash functions and guidelines
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Notes: 1. “TDES” stands for “triple DES.”
2. ISO 9564-1 specifies that PIN encipherment keys shall be at least 112 bits in length (ISO
[2002a]).
3. EMV specifies 1984 bits as the maximum key length for RSA (EMVco [2004]).
4. JBA specifies 1984 bits as the maximum key length for RSA (JBA [2006]).
5. FINREAD specifies 1024 bits or longer as the length for RSA (CEN/ISSS [2002]).they also include three-key triple DES. AES is described as a recommended algorithm
only in ISO/TR 17944 (ISO [2002b]).
All ISO/TC68-related international standards for asymmetric ciphers specify RSA.
The only description for the recommended key length of RSA occurs in ISO/TR
13569, which recommends 1024 bits or longer (ISO [1998b]). Other than RSA,
ISO/TR 17944 describes DSA and ECDSA as recommended algorithms. According
to ISO/TR 13569, DSA and ECDSA key lengths should be 1024 bits or longer and
160 bits or longer, respectively.
All ISO/TC68-related international standards that address hash functions specify
SHA-1. ISO/DIS 11568-4 (ISO [1998a]), a draft for the international standard 
for key management using asymmetric ciphers, specifies hash functions specified in
ISO/IEC 10118-3 (the international standards of hash functions for general com-
merce) (ISO and IEC [2004]) as the approved hash functions in the normative annex.
ISO/IEC 10118-3 also specifies SHA-1.
Several technical specifications are also widely referenced. These include the
Japanese Bankers Association (JBA) IC cash card specifications (JBA [2006]), EMV
smart card specifications (version 4.1, EMVco [2004]), and FINREAD technical
specifications for smart card readers (CEN/ISSS [2002]). These specifications also
exhibit the same tendencies as the international standards. It is especially notable that
EMV specifies two-key triple DES for a symmetric cipher.
Since it is likely that financial institutions actually adopt cryptographic algorithms
in accordance with these international standards and guidelines, it is reasonable to
assume that triple DES is widely used as a symmetric cipher in the financial sector.
Published documents do not clearly indicate which of two-key or three-key triple
DES is adopted. However, since ISO 9564-1 specifies the key length used to encrypt
PINs as at least 112 bits, and as many applications adopt EMV specifying use of two-
key triple DES, as with the IC cash card standard specifications of JBA, one naturally
would conclude that two-key triple DES is used quite widely.
Descriptions of RSA key length are also scarce, with only ISO/TR 13569 specify-
ing a key length of 1024 bits or longer. To implement RSA efficiently, it is reasonable
to select the shortest key length, 1024 bits. The SWIFT bilateral key exchange (BKE)
is a well-known example of 1024-bit RSA (SWIFT [2000]). BKE is a system for 
distributing keys for generating a MAC in SWIFTNet, which is the network system 
for transmitting transaction information between financial institutions. SWIFT has
openly indicated that it uses 1024-bit RSA as the key transport algorithm. EMV 
security guidelines also give the recommended RSA key length implemented in smart
cards as 1024 bits, up to the end of 2009 (EMVco [2005]). Here, these guidelines also
state the recommended key lengths for use up to the end of 2012, 2014, and 2016 as
1152 bits, 1408 bits, and 1984 bits, respectively.
B. Cryptographic Algorithms Specified in the IETF Standards
When providing Internet banking services, financial institutions use cryptographic
algorithms to authenticate their customers (client authentication) and encrypt trans-
mitted data. These encryption and authentication functions are generally implemented
by SSL, a de facto standard in web browsers such as Internet Explorer. SSL is specified
134 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MARCH 2007in the RFC of IETF as the TLS version 1.0.
8 An Internet draft of TLS version 1.1 has
also been proposed.
9
The cryptographic algorithms used in SSL version 3.0/TLS version 1.0 are as 
follows: The symmetric ciphers are triple DES, DES, RC2, RC4, IDEA, AES, Camellia,
and SEED; asymmetric ciphers are RSA, DSA, and the Diffie-Hellman key agreement
scheme (referred to as DH hereafter); and hash functions are SHA-1 and MD5. Among
these, triple DES and RC4 are considered mainly used for symmetric ciphers. The key
length for an asymmetric cipher is generally assumed to be 1024 bits in most cases (e.g.,
Preneel et al. [2004]).
Other cryptographic algorithms specified in the RFC of IETF include MISTY1
for symmetric ciphers and ECDH and ECDSA for asymmetric ciphers.
III. Security Evaluation Results for Major Cryptographic
Algorithms
Section III summarizes security evaluation results for the cryptographic algorithms
that were described in Section II.
A. Symmetric Ciphers
Symmetric ciphers can be classified into block ciphers and stream ciphers. Block
ciphers divide a plaintext to be encrypted into portions of a fixed size (the portions are
referred to as “blocks”) and encrypt each block at a time. Stream ciphers generate
pseudo-random numbers of the same size as the plaintext and generate the ciphertext
by calculating the exclusive OR (XOR) serially bit by bit. The security evaluation
results for the cryptographic algorithms introduced in Section II are described below:
namely, triple DES, DES, RC2, IDEA, MISTY1, AES, Camellia, SEED (these are
block ciphers), and RC4 (a stream cipher), according to these categories.
1. Block ciphers
Attacks against the block ciphers can be divided into shortcut attacks and brute force
attacks. The shortcut attacks try to minimize the computational complexity required
to find the correct key by exploiting the analytical and statistical characteristics of 
the algorithms. The brute force attacks try one possible encryption key after another
to obtain information on the correct key and/or the plaintext. We define that a block
cipher is “academically broken” by a certain attack if the computational complexity
required for the attack is less than that for an exhaustive search.
10 We call a block
cipher “secure” if such an attack has not been found so far. The situation of “academi-
cally broken” does not always mean that the algorithm cannot be used for practical
operations immediately. However, the fact of being academically broken will reduce
confidence in the performance of a cryptographer who designed the corresponding
135
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8. See Blake-Wilson et al. (2003) and Dierks and Allen (1999).
9. See Blake-Wilson et al. (2005) and Dierks and Rescorla (2005).
10. A type of brute force attack, the exhaustive key search tries to find the correct key by trying one candidate key 
after another. For a cipher with key length of n bits, the exhaustive key search needs to perform 2
n encryption
operations to find the key with a probability of one.algorithm and raise the possibility of other, yet-to-be-discovered fatal defects.
Consequently, its use will tend to decline.
a. Shortcut attacks
The applicability of the shortcut attacks depends on the structure of each algorithm.
Table 2 summarizes information on the shortcut attacks proposed to date for each
algorithm. The table shows that RC2 has been academically broken with differential
cryptanalysis (IPA and TAO [2003]).
11 No strong shortcut attacks are reported for the
other algorithms.
b. Brute force attacks
A cryptographic algorithm is also evaluated as to whether it is academically broken by
brute force attacks by comparing the computational complexity required to perform a
specific attack in question with that required for the exhaustive key search. Table 3
summarizes the results of applying brute force attacks.
For triple DES, both two-key and three-key triple DES has already been academi-
cally broken with lower computational complexity (2
57 and 2
112, respectively) than that
required for the exhaustive key search (Merkle and Hellman [1981]). Since this attack
requires obtaining 2
56 pairs of plaintext and ciphertext, such an attack is not expected
to pose problems in practice. As a result, however, two-key triple DES is now evalu-
ated in respect to computational complexity as “it is permissibly said that 2-key Triple
DES can be practically broken because the number of calculation complexity is two
times that of the exhaustive key search” according to CRYPTREC Report 2002 (IPA
and TAO [2003, p. 172]). On the other hand, since the block size (64 bits) of triple
DES is relatively short, its potential susceptibility to a ciphertext matching attack has
been pointed out.
12 The memory required to apply such an attack to triple DES is 
32 gigabytes, which is increasingly becoming feasible.
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Table 2  Security of Block Ciphers against Shortcut Attacks


























(Secure) No reports exist of shortcut attacks
capable of finding the correct key with com-
putational complexity less than that required
for the exhaustive key search.
(Academically broken) There exists differential
cryptanalysis capable of finding the correct
key with computational complexity less than
that required for the exhaustive key search.
(Secure) No reports exist of shortcut attacks
capable of finding the correct key with com-
putational complexity less than that required
for the exhaustive key search.
Note: This table is based on information available as of February 20, 2006.
11. Differential cryptanalysis is a class of attacks that can efficiently find the correct key by using algorithmic
characteristics that a certain difference of ciphertext pairs occurs under a certain difference of plaintext pairs with
probability higher than 0.5.
12. The ciphertext matching attack collects a large number of ciphertexts encrypted with the same key, searches for the
same ciphertexts, and uses the result to find the corresponding plaintexts and correct key. Security against thisFor RC2, IDEA, and MISTY1, no brute force attacks enabled with lower compu-
tational complexity than the exhaustive key search have been reported. However, as
with triple DES, these ciphers require consideration with respect to risks of the
ciphertext matching attack.
No such concerns currently apply for 128-bit block ciphers, AES, Camellia, and
SEED. The ciphertext matching attack for a 128-bit block cipher requires at least 2
64
ciphertexts encrypted with the same key and 2
28 terabytes of memory. Given the diffi-
culty of preparing this enormous amount of memory, these ciphers are considered
adequately secure against the ciphertext matching attack.
2. Stream ciphers
Stream ciphers basically generate a pseudo-random number whose size is the same as
that of a plaintext and calculate XOR between the pseudo-random number and the
plaintext bit by bit to generate a ciphertext. Its security depends largely on 
the pseudo-random number generator. If the generator has a defect whereby the
encryption key and the pseudo-random numbers are strongly correlated or future
pseudo-random numbers can be efficiently predicted from the past numbers, an
137
Year 2010 Issues on Cryptographic Algorithms
Table 3  Security of Block Ciphers against Brute Force Attacks





























(Academically broken) An attack capable of
finding the correct key with computational
complexity (2
57), which is less than that
required for the exhaustive key search, 
has been proposed. Although it requires 2
56
pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts, the 
computational complexity is reaching 
a feasible level.
(Note) A ciphertext matching attack is possible
with approximately 2
32 ciphertexts.
(Academically broken) An attack capable of
finding the correct key with computational 
complexity (2
112) less than that required for 
the exhaustive key search has been pro-
posed. It requires 2
56 pairs of plaintexts 
and ciphertexts.
(Note) A ciphertext matching attack is possible
with approximately 2
32 ciphertexts.
(Note) No reports have been published on
attacks capable of finding the correct key 
with computational complexity less than that
required for the exhaustive key search.
However, a ciphertext matching attack is 
possible with approximately 2
32 ciphertexts.
(Secure) No reports exist of attacks capable 
of finding the correct key with computational
complexity less than that required for the
exhaustive key search.
Note: This table is based on information available as of November 7, 2005.
attack can be evaluated based on block size. For example, for ann-bit block cipher, if 2
n/2 ciphertexts (approximately
n*2
(n/2-33) gigabytes) encrypted by the same key are randomlycollected, it is known that at least a pair of ciphertexts
can be found with probability higher than 0.5.attacker can easily obtain the pseudo-random numbers or the correct key and, as a
result, decrypt the ciphertext.
RC4 is considered to be the most widely used among stream ciphers proposed to
date. SSL version 3.0/TLS version 1.0 also adopts RC4 as one of its symmetric ciphers,
and many financial institutions appear to select RC4 as the symmetric cipher for data
encryption in Internet banking systems.
According to the security evaluation results for RC4, no attacks that academically
break RC4 have been reported as long as the key length is 128 bits and the parameter
13
is set as being specified in the standard specifications in SSL version 3.0/TLS version
1.0. However, for the RC4 implementation incorporated into Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP), which is the communication protocol used in wireless local area 
networks (LANs), strong correlation may arise between the pseudo-random numbers
and the encryption key, due to insufficient permutation of initial states. An example is
known of successful identification of the encryption key based on this weakness
(Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir [2002]).
14 Thus, CRYPTREC does not recommend 
RC4 with parameters other than those specified in the SSL version 3.0/TLS version 1.0
standard (MIAC and METI [2003]).
B. Asymmetric Ciphers
This paper selects RSA, DSA, DH, and ECDSA as examples of asymmetric ciphers
and summarizes security evaluation results for these algorithms.
15 We define “probable
security” as a property that security of a cryptographic algorithm can be proved to 
be equivalent
16 to the difficulty of a mathematical problem such as factoring under 
certain assumptions.
1. RSA (evaluation of difficulty in factoring)
The security of RSA depends on the difficulty of factoring of large composite numbers.
The RSA primitive algorithm permits numerous variations in encryption and digital
signature schemes. For example, the encryption schemes include PKCS#1 version 1.5
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5), RSA-OAEP and RSA-KEM, while the signature schemes
include RSA-PSS and the ISO/IEC 9796. These schemes have been proposed to 
provide the RSA primitive algorithm with specific security features and/or to improve
the performance. For example, some among them, such as RSA-OAEP, RSA-KEM and
RSA-PSS, provide provable security—that is, the security of the scheme can be proved
to be equivalent to the difficulty of factoring under certain assumptions. However, 
none of these methods could prevent cryptanalysis and signature forgery either if an 
efficient algorithm for factoring were proposed or if a powerful hardware for factoring
were developed. 
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13. This parameter determines internal states. For example, when the value of the parameter isn, the number of internal
states is 2
n. The standard parameter setting isn = 8.
14. Researchers have devised ways to improve the security of WEP against such attacks by modifying part of WEP,
given WEP’s wide deployment. However, some researchers believe even these measures are inadequate. See Yoshida,
Kobara, and Imai (2005).
15. It is known that factoring could be readily solved if quantum computers would be developed. However, some
researchers argue that factoring several-thousand-bit public keys would require a quantum computer with several
tens of thousand q-bits. The development of such a machine within 20 to 30 years is considered highly unlikely.
Thus, we omit considering the implications of the quantum computers for security in the ensuing discussion.
16. This means that the algorithm can be broken if and only if the mathematical problem can be solved.Many researchers have performed computer experiments to determine the size of the
composite number (corresponding to RSA key length) that can be practically factored.
In May 2005, with the general number field sieve, which is currently considered the
fastest, a 663-bit composite number was successfully factored.
17
Several papers have also been published on how to build dedicated factoring 
hardware. For instance, Franke et al. (2005) proposed SHARK, which was the dedi-
cated hardware for the sieving process (also referred to as a collection of relations). The
sieving process accounts for the largest part of the general number field sieve in terms
of the computational complexity. Their results indicate that the sieving process for the
1024-bit factoring can be performed at a cost of approximately US$200 million over 
a period of one year. On the other hand, Geiselmann et al. (2005) discuss the 
feasibility of dedicated hardware that processes matrix calculations with regard to 
factoring of a 1024-bit composite number. They claimed that the matrix calculations
could be done at a cost of approximately US$2 million over a period of approximately 
2.4 months.
Discussed next are the results of studies on the feasibility of factoring of a 1024-bit
composite number with respect to the computational complexity and cost. Brent
(2000) examined the possibility of future factoring from the past achievements based
on Moore’s Law.
18 He estimated that a 1024-bit composite number may be able to be
practically factored somewhere around the year 2018 with the general number field
sieve. Lenstra and Verheul (2001) examined the key length required to achieve strength
equal to DES in 1982, at which DES was regarded as being adequately secure. They
concluded that 1024-bit RSA in 2002 approximately offered the same security level as
DES in 1982. It recommends an RSA key length of 2048 bits to provide adequate
security for 20 years beginning 2001. Kaliski (2003) recommended 1024-bit RSA 
as an asymmetric cipher providing adequate security until 2010, after which he 
recommended moving to 2048-bit RSA or higher for use up to 2030. 
The NESSIE report on the cryptographic algorithm evaluation (Preneel et al.
[2004]) showed results of studies on the computational complexity for ensuring
medium-term security. It is assumed that the computational complexity required 
for 512-bit factoring is equivalent to that required for the exhaustive key search for 
a 56-bit key, that is, 2
56 of computational complexity. Based on this assumption, 
the report concluded that the computational complexity required for factoring of a
1536-bit composite number is approximately equivalent to that required for the
exhaustive key search for an 80-bit key.
According to these results, we can say that a 1024-bit RSA will not provide adequate
long-term security in 2010.
2. DSA and DH (evaluation of difficulty in the discrete logarithm problem)
DSA does not provide provable security, but no fatal defects have been published to
date with respect to the algorithm itself, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, except
for the weakness in the pseudo-random number generator. As for DH, no efficient
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17. In January 2006, a 911-bit special composite number was also successfully factored.
18. Moore’s law, proposed by Gordon Moore, states that integration density of a semiconductor device doubles 
every 18 to 24 months. This law is often used to predict the future performance of semiconductor devices and the
development of associated information technologies. The idea often arises in the context of information security.attack against the algorithm itself has been proposed, again, to the best of the authors’
knowledge, except to solve the discrete logarithm problem.
The security of DSA and DH depends on the difficulty of solving the discrete 
logarithm problem in the multiplicative group of a finite field (hereafter referred to 
as DLP). Currently, the fastest algorithm for solving DLP is the index calculus, and 
various methods have been proposed as its variations.
19 In 2002, it was reported that
DLP in the multiplicative group with 607-bit modulus (the modulus corresponds to
the key length) could be successfully solved (Thomé [2002]).
The algorithm for the index calculus is known to be closely related to the general
number field sieve for factoring. The order of the computational complexity required
to solve DLP with the index calculus is regarded as being equivalent to that required
for the general number field sieve when key length is the same, as in, for example,
Preneel  et al. (2004). Thus, the key length of the algorithms based on DLP is 
generally set as long as that of the algorithms based on the factoring problem. In fact,
as with RSA, 1024-bit key length is generally adopted in DSA and DH. As described
in Section III.B.1, it is likely that factoring of a 1024-bit composite number will no
longer be infeasible for a long time period as of 2010. Thus, the key length of DSA
and DH should be updated as 2010 approaches.
3. ECDSA (evaluation of difficulty in the elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem)
ECDSA is based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem for the
group of rational points on an elliptic curve over some finite field (hereafter referred to
as ECDLP, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem). As with DSA, ECDSA lacks
the provable security, but the authors know of no fatal attack capable of breaching the
security. For this reason, in current evaluations of ECDSA security, we focus on the
relationship between the difficulty of ECDLP and the key length.
It is known that the index calculus cannot be easily applied to solve ECDLP for
ECDSA if the elliptic curve is appropriately selected. The most efficient algorithm for
solving ECDSA differs with elliptic curves used. This implies that it is necessary to
avoid selecting specific elliptic curves under which ECDLP can be efficiently solved.
Such curves can be found in Frey and Rück (1994), Menezes, Okamoto, and
Vanstone (1991), and Sato and Araki (1998). ANS X9.62 (to which ISO/TR 17944
also refers), which specifies ECDSA for financial purposes, does not recommend any
specific elliptic curves.
Given these concerns, the question is to determine an appropriate key length.
Since ISO/TR 13569 specifies that the key length (corresponding to the size of the
order of the finite field) should be set as 160 bits or more, 160 bits appears to be
selected in the financial sector.
The computational resources and time required to solve ECDLP have been
demonstrated in a contest held by Certicom Research. ECDLP over the finite field
with the order of 109 bits has reportedly been solved.
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19. See, for example, Coppersmith (1984), ElGamal (1985), Gordon (1993), Pomerance (1987), Schirokauer (1993),
and Schirokauer, Weber, and Denny (1996).For ECDLP over the finite field with the order of 160 bits, Lenstra and Verheul
(2001) estimated that, in 2010, elliptic curve cryptosystems with a 160-bit key would
ensure security equivalent to DES in 1982—that is, they would provide adequate 
long-term security—under an assumption that cryptanalytic progress halves the com-
putational complexity every 18 months. When the assumption does not hold, they see
the level of security provided in 2020 as equivalent to DES in 1982. According to the
NESSIE report (Preneel et al. [2004]), the key length required to ensure medium-term
security was estimated as 160 bits as of 2003. This conclusion is consistent with the 
key length currently adopted. On the other hand, Certicom Research (2000) estimated 
that elliptic curve cryptosystems with a 160-bit key provided security equivalent to
1024-bit RSA and DSA or symmetric ciphers with an 80-bit key.
According to Lenstra and Verheul (2001), it is likely that ECDSA with a 160-bit
key does not present particular problems after 2010. According to Certicom Research
(2000), the key length should be lengthened to 224 bits or more. As such, there exists
a range of the minimum recommended key length between 160 and 224 bits. If one
would like to pay much attention to the security, it is desirable to select a key length of
224 bits or more as recommended in Certicom Research (2000).
C. Hash Function
In this subsection, we will focus on SHA-1, because it is the most widely used hash
function. In February 2005, Wang, Yin, and Yu (2005) published research results 
that SHA-1 collisions
20 can be found with the computational complexity equivalent 
to 2
69 hash function operations. In addition, Wang, Yao, and Yao (2005) claimed 
that SHA-1 collisions can be found with the computational complexity equivalent to 
2
63 hash function operations.
21 However, no examples of message pairs that cause 
collisions have been published.
To find collisions with relatively high probability for a secure hash function, one
must collect 2
(n/2) hash values when the size of the hash values is n bits because of the
birthday attack. If it becomes clear that collisions can be found with the computational
complexity less than 2
(n/2) hash function operations, the hash function is regarded as
being academically insecure. For SHA-1, the size of the hash values is 160 bits, which
makes 2
(n/2)=2
80. This amount is larger than 2
69, which is the computational complexity
required for Wang’s attack. This means that SHA-1 is academically insecure if Wang’s
claim is correct.
Even though collisions may have been found, they would rarely occur in meaning-
ful messages. In addition, if a message would be altered using the collisions, it would
be likely that the alteration could be actually detected by checking the meaning of the
message. In other words, the hash function has not been rendered instantly insecure for
real-world use, and practical attacks in which the alteration cannot be detected even
when considering the meaning of the sentences still present formidable difficulties.
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20. A collision in a hash function refers to a pair of different input values that produce the same output. Hash functions
are designed so that it is difficult to find such collisions.
21. At RSA Conference 2006, Wang (2006) showed a new estimation that SHA-1 collisions can be found with the 
computational complexity equivalent to about 2
61 hash function operations.Nevertheless, one cannot always conclude that “academically insecure” hash func-
tions are free from serious security breaches. If data added to messages such as control
codes, padding data, and random number sequences can be altered, collisions may
arise between two different messages unrelated to the sentences themselves or whose
validity cannot be determined from the meaning of the sentences (Lucks and Daum
[2005]). In these cases, it is difficult to detect alterations even when considering the
meaning of the sentences.
Lenstra, Wang, and de Weger (2005) proposed a method for the construction of
pairs of valid X.509 certificates in which the “to be signed” parts form a collision for
the MD5 hash function. As a result, the issuer signatures in the certificates will be 
the same when the issuer uses MD5 as its hash function. Although the attack is not
practical, their paper shows potential applications of collisions of hash functions.
The potential for a serious breach resulting from collisions depends on how the
hash function is used. To ensure the utmost security, it is generally considered to be
appropriate to switch to a new hash function, which is evaluated to be more secure if
the current hash function is linked even once to the possibility of a collision.
IV. NIST Policies and Impacts on Year 2010 Issues
This section addresses current NIST policies regarding a transition of the cryptographic
algorithms discussed in the previous section, as well as Year 2010 issues.
A. NIST Policies in Selecting Cryptographic Algorithms
1. FIPS and SP
NIST is granted the authority for information security measures for the U.S. Federal
Government through various acts and orders, including the Computer Security Act 
of 1987, the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, the Federal
Information Security Management Act of 2002, and Executive Order #13011. Based
on this authority, NIST develops FIPSs
22 and SPs,
23 which involve cryptographic 
techniques, security products, their evaluation methods, and security management
(see Table 4).
For cryptographic algorithms, NIST has developed FIPSs and SPs that specify
block ciphers, digital signature schemes, and hash functions. For block ciphers, NIST
has approved AES (FIPS 197), two-key/three-key triple DES (SP800-67), and
Skipjack (FIPS 185). For digital signature schemes, NIST has approved RSA, DSA,
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22. A Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) specifies information techniques to be adopted in IT systems
used by the U.S. Federal Government (except national security systems) for treating “unclassified but sensitive
information” (such as privacy-related information). Security products not conforming to FIPS fail to meet the
specification requirements for the systems, and it is virtually impossible to procure such products. For this reason,
the cryptographic techniques specified in FIPS are referred to as enforceable U.S. Federal Government standard.
23. A Special Publication (SP) is published as general technical information for recommended techniques or as accom-
panying information for an FIPS on an as-needed basis. While SPs are not enforced and adoption is voluntary,
based on circumstances, nevertheless, when they provide information supplemental to an FIPS, an SP tends to
describe additional information for specifications and guidelines not specified in the corresponding FIPS. In such
cases, the SP may become part of a de facto enforceable specification.and ECDSA (FIPS 186-2).
24 For hash functions, NIST has approved SHA series
(SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512) (FIPS 180-2). For key
agreement schemes, NIST has approved DH and the Menezes-Qu-Vanstone method
(referred to as MQV hereafter) (SP800-56).
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24. In March 2006, NIST published a draft of FIPS 186-3 (NIST [2006a]) as a revised version of FIPS 186-2.
Table 4  Major FIPSs and SPs Concerning Cryptographic Techniques






































Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the
Federal Government
Recommendation on Key Management 
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Personal Identity Verification
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation—Methods and Techniques
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication
and Confidentiality
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for
Confidentiality and Authentication (Draft)
Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 
Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography
Computer Data Authentication
The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
(HMAC)
Entity Authentication Using Public Key
Cryptography
Recommendation for Random Number

































Note: A draft of FIPS 186-3 that will supersede FIPS 186-2 is available for public comment from 
March 2006.With regard to triple DES, FIPS 46-3, which specified triple DES, has already been
withdrawn in May 2005, and triple DES is thereafter specified in SP800-67 only. The
SP states that two-key triple DES may be used up to 2010 but not thereafter.
2. Prospects for transition of cryptographic algorithms and key lengths
In addition to approval of cryptographic algorithms through FIPSs and SPs, NIST
releases SP800-57 and SP800-78 guidelines that provide information on the transition
prospects for the algorithms and key lengths.
a. SP800-57
SP800-57 is a guideline that addresses key management of the cryptographic algo-
rithms used in IT systems of the U.S. Federal Government (NIST [2005a]). It provides
detailed information required to implement the cryptographic algorithms, including
various types of encryption keys, their use, and required key lengths (Table 5). As 
shown in Table 5, SP800-57 describes NIST’s recommendation of cryptographic 
algorithms and key lengths by separating cases into those for which they may be used
up to the end of 2010, up to the end of 2030, and after 2030.
For applications approved for use up to the end of 2010, the recommended 
symmetric ciphers include two-key triple DES. However, two-key triple DES is not
included for applications to be used after 2010. For use of asymmetric ciphers based
on the factoring problem and DLP through 2030, the recommended key length is
2048 bits. For those based on ECDLP, the recommended key length is 224 bits.
For two-key triple DES, 1024-bit RSA and 1024-bit DSA, which are believed to
be in wide use in the financial sector, NIST has indicated that the U.S. Federal
Government will drop their use from its IT systems after 2010.
SP800-57 states that it does not recommend SHA-1 as a hash function used for
digital signature applications when constructing new IT systems in the future.
b. SP800-78
SP800-78 describes various cryptographic algorithms and key lengths to be adopted
in Personal Identity Verification (PIV) systems by the U.S. Federal Government
(NIST [2005b]). The PIV systems authenticate Federal employees and contractors
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Table 5  Prospects of Transitions in Cryptographic Algorithms Described 
in SP800-57 (NIST [2005a])
Algorithm Asymmetric Asymmetric ciphers Asymmetric
security Symmetric ciphers ciphers based  based on DLP ciphers based









•AES (with key length of
128, 192, or 256 bits)
•Three-key triple DEA
•AES (with key length of
128, 192, or 256 bits)
AES (with key length of



















Minimum key length of
1024 bits (order q of the
subgroup over the finite
field is 160 bits.)
Minimum key length of
2048 bits (order q of the
subgroup over the finite
field is 224 bits.)
Minimum key length of
3072 bits (order q of the
subgroup over the finite
field is 256 bits.)
Note: The table is summarized based on Table 4 from NIST (2005a).using official certificates or related information for the purpose of access control to IT 
systems of the U.S. Federal Government. FIPS 201 (Personal Identity Verification of
Federal Employees and Contractors) describes configuration of the PIV systems in
which smart cards (known as the PIV cards) are distributed to the Federal employees
(NIST [2005c]). In FIPS 201, it is illustrated that individuals are authenticated with
cryptographic techniques based on the public key infrastructure. SP800-78 contains
information that supplements FIPS 201 in light of cryptographic algorithms and is
regarded as a mandatory specification in practice.
SP800-78 describes the four types of keys stored on the PIV card: (1) a mandatory
PIV authentication key, (2) an optional card authentication key, (3) an optional digital
signature key, and (4) an optional key management key. The mandatory PIV authen-
tication key is a secret key for generating a digital signature of the corresponding PIV
card holder. The optional card authentication key is a secret key for generating a MAC
or a digital signature of the corresponding PIV card. The optional digital signature 
key is a secret key for generating a digital signature except for the purpose of the card
holder authentication.
Table 6 shows cryptographic algorithms and key lengths used for these keys. AES
and triple DES are recommended for symmetric ciphers. RSA and ECDSA (or other
elliptic curve cryptosystems) are recommended for asymmetric ciphers.
Focusing on the mandatory PIV authentication key in Table 6, we can clearly
understand that 1024-bit RSA is recommended for use up to the end of 2010, while
2048-bit RSA is at least recommended after 2010. For symmetric ciphers, two-key
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Table 6  Prospects of Transition of Cryptographic Algorithms Described in SP800-78
(NIST [2005b])


























•RSA (key length: 1024, 2048, or 3072 bits)
•ECDSA (key length: from 224 to 283 bits)
•RSA (key length: 2048 or 3072 bits)
•ECDSA (key length: from 224 to 283 bits)
Symmetric •Two-key  triple  DES 
ciphers •Three-key triple DES 
•AES (key length: 128, 192, or 256 bits)
Asymmetric  •RSA (key length: 1024, 2048, or 3072 bits)
ciphers •ECDSA (key length: from 224 to 283 bits)
Symmetric •Three-key  triple  DES 
ciphers •AES (key length: 128, 192, or 256 bits)
Asymmetric  •RSA (key length: 2048 or 3072 bits)
ciphers •ECDSA (key length: from 224 to 283 bits)
•RSA (key length: 1024, 2048, or 3072 bits)
•ECDSA (key length: from 224 to 283 bits)
•RSA (key length: 2048 or 3072 bits)
•ECDSA (key length: from 224 to 283 bits)
•RSA (key length: 1024, 2048, or 3072 bits)
•ECDH or ECC MQV (key length: from 224 to 283 bits)
•RSA (key length: 2048 or 3072 bits)
•ECDH or ECC MQV (key length: from 224 to 283 bits)
Note: This table is summarized based on table 3-1 of NIST (2005b).triple DES is recommended as the optional card authentication key up to the end of
2010. ECDSA, which is suitable for smart cards, is also included among the digital
signature algorithms in addition to RSA. The key length of ECDSA is recommended
to be 224 bits or more after 2010.
For hash functions, SP800-78 recommends SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256 up
to the end of 2010, and also recommends SHA-224 and SHA-256 after 2010.
3. Prospects for SHA-1
NIST released a comment concerning the handling of SHA-1 directly after a collision
was found for SHA-0, which is SHA-1’s predecessor (NIST [2004a]). NIST states as
follows: “The results presented so far on SHA-1 do not call its security into question.
However, due to advances in technology, NIST plans to phase out of SHA-1 in favor
of the larger and stronger hash functions (SHA-224, SHA-256, ASHA-384 and 
SHA-512) by 2010.” And then, in response to Wang’s presentation of the attack 
proposed for SHA-1, NIST released the following comment (NIST [2005d]): “Due
to advances in computing power, NIST already planned to phase out SHA-1 in 
favor of the larger and stronger hash functions (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 
and SHA-512) by 2010. New developments should use the larger and stronger 
hash functions.” In March 2006, NIST also released the following comment at its
website:
25 “The SHA-2 family of hash functions (i.e., SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384
and SHA-512) may be used by Federal agencies for all applications using secure hash
algorithms. Federal agencies should stop using SHA-1 for digital signatures, digital
time stamping and other applications that require collision resistance as soon as 
practical, and must use the SHA-2 family of hash functions for these applications 
after 2010.”
These comments are consistent with descriptions concerning use of hash functions
in SP800-78 as discussed in Section III.C. Thus, it is quite likely that use of SHA-1
will be stopped in the U.S. Federal Government by 2010. NIST also held hash 
function workshops in October 2005 and another one in August 2006 in response to
the SHA-1 attack.
B. Past Responses in ISO/TC68: DES and Triple DES
As introduced in Section III and Section IV.A, the major evaluation results have 
indicated that the cryptographic algorithms now widely used in the financial 
sector are unlikely to maintain adequate security for a long time period. NIST has
published the plan for the transition to stronger algorithms in IT systems of the U.S.
Federal Government by 2010. This indicates the revocation of the NIST guarantee
for the security of the mainstream algorithms. As a result, the revocation may con-
siderably damage the reputation for security of financial IT systems adopting the
mainstream algorithms.
In the financial sector, the international standards were traditionally set based on
cryptographic algorithms evaluated by NIST as sufficiently secure. The following two
situations similar to Year 2010 issues have arisen before.
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25. The URL is http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/tkhash.html.The first case involves the approval of DES as FIPS 46 in 1977. After FIPS 46 was
released, ISO/TC68 began developing international standards for information security
techniques based on DES. It is believed that ISO/TC68 decided to adopt DES in 
the international standards because NIST had approved DES in FIPS 46 (Taniguchi,
Ohta, and Ohkubo [1999]).
The second case involves the withdrawal of DES in 1999 and subsequent NIST
approval of triple DES as FIPS 46-3. It was considered that triple DES was approved
as a temporal successor of DES until AES was practically available. After the approval
of DES as FIPS 46, ISO/TC68 accordingly followed the research results on the 
security of DES. In 1997, a survey paper regarding the security evaluation of DES
(Kusuda and Matsumoto [1997]) was submitted to ISO/TC68 from Japan as a 
technical contribution. When NIST released FIPS 46-3 in 1999 and determined the
transition from DES to triple DES, ISO/TC68 immediately launched discussion on
adopting triple DES to its international standards. At the time, ANS X9.52, which 
was the U.S. domestic standard developed in 1998, had already been published 
as the standard for triple DES in the financial sector. NIST released FIPS 46-3 to 
specify triple DES, referring to ANS X9.52. Subsequently, ISO/TC68 began discussing 
the possibility of making ANS X9.52 an international standard. As a result,
ISO/TC68/SC2/WG11 developed ISO/TR 19038, which is a technical report on 
how to implement triple DES, in 2004. In addition, ISO/TC68 has updated various
standards in such a way to transit from DES to triple DES.
Thus, the international standards regarding DES and triple DES in ISO/TC68
have been developed in accordance with NIST approval of cryptographic algorithms.
C. Responses to Year 2010 Issues and Their Impact on the Financial Sector
Year 2010 issues are raised by the fact that the guarantee for the security of crypto-
graphic algorithms will be lifted by NIST around 2010. According to the history of
the international standards in the financial industry, financial institutions have placed
their trust in the security evaluation results for cryptographic algorithms performed by
NIST, and have moved to new cryptographic algorithms in accordance with NIST
policies. Thus, it is reasonable that financial institutions and standardization bodies
such as ISO/TC68 also advance the transition to new cryptographic algorithms based
on NIST policies when dealing with Year 2010 issues.
26
Such responses are also important for maintaining confidence in the international
standards developed by ISO/TC68 from the viewpoint of security. Even if the transi-
tion to stronger algorithms were to fail in 2010, it is unlikely that the security of IT
systems adopting the current algorithms would simply collapse. However, if financial
institutions would continue to use cryptographic algorithms, which have already lost
the guarantee for security, the financial institutions would inevitably lose confidence
in the security of their IT systems. More seriously, in the sense that such financial
institutions failed to respond to Year 2010 issues in a timely manner despite the
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26. NESSIE and CRYPTREC evaluations also emphasize the results of NIST evaluations of cryptographic algorithms.
Evaluations of AES by NESSIE highlight that NIST has performed detailed evaluations. The e-Government
Recommended Ciphers List released by CRYPTREC (MIAC and METI [2003]) on February 21 2006, includes
three-key triple DES, under the condition that it is specified as SP800-67.release of the NIST transition schedule in 2005, the reputation of the corresponding
financial institutions would be damaged due to lack of their awareness regarding
importance of information security measures.
Responses to Year 2010 issues target all cryptographic algorithms currently con-
sidered the mainstream. The cryptographic algorithms in question are widely used 
in the financial sector, and the current situation differs from the past transitions as in
the case of DES or triple DES. Further, in addition to growing numbers of financial
institutions using cryptographic algorithms, a scope of financial services using crypto-
graphic algorithms is also expanding, including interbank networks, IC cash cards, 
and Internet banking services. A transition to new cryptographic algorithms should 
be undertaken appropriately and timely in these diverse IT systems. Inevitably, the
number of discussion points to be examined by financial institutions seems to be 
larger in Year 2010 issues than in past situations. Therefore, it may take more time to
successfully complete the transition this time. These considerations suggest that
responses to Year 2010 issues should be initiated as soon as possible.
Given these points, we need to be aware of the importance of responses to Year
2010 issues, and begin to examine how we can best address these issues.
V. Addressing Year 2010 Issues
In discussing how to address Year 2010 issues, the financial institutions need to 
consider which cryptographic algorithms will be selected and how IT systems will be
updated to adopt the new algorithms. In this section, we will clarify major points to
be discussed.
A. Cryptographic Algorithms Specified, Approved, and Recommended 
by Various Organizations and Projects
One possible course of action in selecting cryptographic algorithms for long-term use
after 2010 is to select ones approved or recommended by NIST. However, in contrast to
the time at which DES or triple DES was adopted, several alternative algorithms are now
recommended by third-party organizations other than NIST, comprised of crypto-
graphers and other experts. For instance, CRYPTREC has developed the e-Government
Recommended Ciphers List, and NESSIE has published the security evaluation results
for several cryptographic algorithms. ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27, which is responsible 
for standardizing information security techniques for general purposes, has already
developed ISO/IEC 18033, which specifies the cryptographic algorithms used to 
protect confidentiality. This standard was examined with reference to the evaluation
results by NIST, CRYPTREC, and NESSIE. Therefore, ISO/IEC 18033 includes 
the cryptographic algorithms specified or recommended by these organizations and
projects. In making final decisions concerning cryptographic algorithms, we may select
algorithms suitable for various requirements not only from the algorithms approved 
or recommended by NIST but also those specified or recommended by the other 
organizations and projects.
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very high level such as RSA to make it easier for the reader to understand. In this 
section, the algorithms specified or recommended in the organizations and projects
will be expressed in the more detailed description to clarify the specifications and 
recommendations.
1. NIST policies
As indicated in SP800-57, NIST recommends the algorithms and the key lengths
listed below assuming use up to 2030 (see Table 5). We refer to NIST (2005a) for
hash functions.
• Symmetric ciphers: AES or three-key triple DES.
• Asymmetric ciphers based on the factoring problem: With the minimum key length
of 2048 bits.
• Asymmetric ciphers based on DLP: With the minimum key length of 2048 bits.
The size of orderq of the subgroup over the finite field is 224 bits.
• Asymmetric ciphers based on ECDLP: With the minimum key length of 224 bits.
• Hash functions: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512.
For asymmetric ciphers, NIST approves RSA (quoting ANS X9.31), DSA, and
ECDSA in FIPS 186-2 (Digital Signature Standard).
27 For the key agreement schemes,
NIST recommends DH, MQV, and methods that implement each of these on elliptic
curves in SP800-56 (NIST [2006b]). NIST considers that the key lengths of DH and
MQV are compatible with those for asymmetric ciphers based on the discrete logarithm
problem described in the same SP.
2. ISO/IEC 18033
ISO/IEC 18033 is the first international standard for cryptographic algorithms used to
protect confidentiality in general purposes. ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 started the standard-
ization activities in April 2000. This international standard has the following structure:
part 2 specifies asymmetric ciphers, part 3 specifies block ciphers, and part 4 specifies
stream ciphers (ISO and IEC [2005a, b, c]). The cryptographic algorithms specified in
ISO/IEC 18033 will be referred to by other international standards that are currently
being developed in ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27. Therefore, it is likely that the algorithms
specified in ISO/IEC 18033 will be used widely in many fields.
Developing ISO/IEC 18033, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 mandated security and per-
formance evaluation results conducted by public organizations such as CRYPTREC
and NESSIE as the necessary condition for the candidate algorithms. As a result, 
the proposed algorithms were those approved by NIST or those recommended by
CRYPTREC or NESSIE. The candidate algorithms were comprehensively examined
with respect to security and implementation performance in SC27. Finally, each part
of this standard has come to specify two or more cryptographic algorithms.
Table 7 summarizes the cryptographic algorithms specified in ISO/IEC 18033.
For asymmetric ciphers, ISO/IEC 18033-2 separately specifies the algorithms based
on the factoring problem, those based on DLP, and those based on ECDLP. All of
these algorithms provide the provable security. However, ISO/IEC 18033-2 does not
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27. The draft of FIPS 186-3 describes the RSA algorithms specified in both ANS X9.31 and PKCS#1 version 2.1 (that
is, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSA-PSS). In terms of DSA and ECDSA, the algorithms are the same as that 
specified in FIPS 186-2. In DSA, the new approved combinations of key length are added.specify key lengths. Therefore, users of this international standard must determine 
the appropriate key length by themselves.
Specifications for symmetric ciphers are given separately for 64-bit block ciphers
and 128-bit block ciphers. For 64-bit block ciphers, ISO/IEC 18033-3 specifies 
CAST-128, MISTY1, and triple DES. In particular, ISO/IEC 18033-3 states that two
options are available for triple DES (two-key and three-key triple DES). However,
ISO/IEC 18033-3 describes that NIST will recommend two-key triple DES up to
approximately 2009 but no later, and recommends three-key triple DES. These state-
ments appear to indicate that ISO/IEC 18033-3 is prompting users to adopt three-key
triple DES if they must use triple DES. For 128-bit block ciphers, ISO/IEC 18033-3
specifies AES, Camellia, and SEED with key lengths set to 128 bits or longer.
For stream ciphers,
28 it specifies MUGI and SNOW 2.0 but not RC4, which is
now widely used.
3. e-Government Recommended Ciphers List by CRYPTREC
CRYPTREC’s final goal was to develop the e-Government Recommended Ciphers List. 
This list consists of cryptographic algorithms suitable for IT systems in Japanese 
e-Government. CRYPTREC was established in May 2000 primarily to evaluate 
the candidate cryptographic algorithms to be incorporated into the e-Government
Recommended Ciphers List.
29 CRYPTREC announced an open solicitation for crypto-
graphic algorithms required for e-Government, then evaluated the submitted 
algorithms based on reports of security evaluations entrusted to leading cryptographers
within and outside Japan and papers presented at academic conferences. CRYPTREC
published the e-Government Recommended Ciphers List in February 2003 (Table 8;
MIAC and METI [2003]).
Reorganized in fiscal 2003, CRYPTREC is now pursuing its activities under a 
new administrative umbrella. Namely, the Cryptographic Technique Monitoring
Committee and the Cryptographic Technique Investigation Working Group monitor
the emergence of security problems in cryptographic algorithms incorporated into the
e-Government Recommended Ciphers List. The Cryptographic Module Committee
performs research for implementing and evaluating secure cryptographic modules.
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•Based on the factoring problem: RSA-KEM, RSA-OAEP, 
and HIME(R)
•Based on DLP: ACE-KEM
•Based on ECDLP: PSEC-KEM and ECIES-KEM
•64-bit block ciphers: CAST-128, MISTY1, and triple DES 
•128-bit block ciphers: AES, Camellia, and SEED
•MUGI
•SNOW 2.0
28. The general model for stream ciphers in ISO/IEC 18033-4 specifies two methods for implementing stream cipher
output functions: a method that calculates the XOR between the key stream and the plaintext and a method using
MULTI-S01.
29. See http://www.cryptrec.jp for information on recent CRYPTREC activities.
Asymmetric ciphers (part 2)In determining cryptographic algorithms to be evaluated, CRYPTREC included the
algorithms already deployed in a wide range of fields (so-called de facto standards), as
well as the submitted ones. CRYPTREC evaluated these algorithms and developed the
e-Government Recommended Ciphers List considering the following points: (1) select
several algorithms with sufficient security for the use in the e-Government system
(security guaranteed roughly 10 years), and (2) select at least one algorithm pre-
incorporated or likely to be incorporated in commercial products for each category.
According toCRYPTREC Report 2002 (IPA and TAO [2003]), recommended key
lengths for asymmetric ciphers as of 2002 are 1024 bits or longer for RSA, DSA, and
DH, and 160 bits or longer for ECDSA. The digital signature schemes for RSA
include RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSA-PSS, which are incorporated into PKCS#1
version 2.1. The encryption schemes for RSA include RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 and 
RSA-OAEP, which are also incorporated into PKCS#1 version 2.1. CRYPTREC
Report 2002 does not describe the evaluation results on advantages and drawbacks of
these schemes. In general, RSA-PSS and RSA-OAEP are considered to be preferable
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Table 8  e-Government Recommended Ciphers List (MIAC and METI [2003])






















DSA, ECDSA, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, and RSA-PSS
RSA-OAEP and RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5
1
DH, ECDH, and PSEC-KEM
2
CIPHERUNICORN-E, Hierocrypt-L1, MISTY1, and three-key
triple DES
4
AES, Camellia, CIPHERUNICORN-A, Hierocrypt-3, and
SC2000




6, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
•PRNG based on SHA-1 in ANSI X9.42-2001 Annex C.1
•PRNG based on SHA-1 for general purpose in FIPS 186-2 
(+ change notice 1) Appendix 3.1
•PRNG based on SHA-1 for general purpose in FIPS 186-2 
(+ change notice 1) revised Appendix 3.1
Notes: 1. This is permitted to be used for the time being because it was used in SSL3.0/TLS1.0.
2. This is permitted to be used only in the KEM (key encapsulation mechanism)-
DEM (data encapsulation mechanism) construction.
3. When constructing a new system for e-Government, 128-bit block ciphers are preferable 
if possible.
4. Three-key triple DES is permitted to be used for the time being under the following 
conditions:
(1) It is specified as SP800-67.
(2) It is positioned as the de facto standard.
5. It is assumed that 128-bit RC4 will be used only in SSL3.0/TLS (1.0 or later). If any other
cipher listed above is available, it should be used instead.
6. If a longer hash value is available when constructing a new system for e-Government, 
it is preferable to select a 256-bit (or more) hash function. However, this does not apply 
to the case where the hash function is designated to be used in the public-key 
cryptographic specification.
7. Since pseudo-random number generators do not require interoperability due to their 
usage characteristics, no problems will occur from the use of a cryptographically secure
pseudo-random number generating algorithm. These algorithms are listed as examples.
Source: MIAC and METI (2003).from the viewpoint of security due to the fact that they are provably secure. Here,
PSEC-KEM is recommended under the following condition: “This is permitted to 




With regard to symmetric ciphers, the e-Government Recommended Ciphers List
includes the following sentence as a note: “When constructing a new system for 
e-Government, 128-bit block ciphers are preferable if possible.” Focusing on 64-bit block
ciphers, we can notice that two-key triple DES is excluded from the list of selected 64-bit
block ciphers. In addition, the following note for three-key triple DES is described:
“Three-key triple DES is permitted to be used for the time being under the following 
conditions: (1) It is specified as SP800-67, (2) It is positioned as the de facto standard.”
Although RC4 with a key length of 128 bits is also recommended, the following 
note is described: “It is assumed that 128-bit RC4 will be used only in SSL3.0/TLS 
(1.0 or later). If any other cipher listed above is available, it should be used instead.”
Although the list of hash functions includes SHA-1, the following note is given:
“If a longer hash value is available when constructing a new system for e-Government,
it is preferable to select a 256-bit (or more) hash function. However, this does not
apply to the case where the hash function is designated to be used in the public-key
cryptographic specification.” On this basis, CRYPTREC appears to recommend
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as acceptable hash functions when new IT 
systems of e-Government are constructed in the future.
4. NESSIE-recommended ciphers
The European Union (EU) launched the NESSIE project in 2000 as part of the Fifth
EU Information Society Technologies Program. The main objective of the NESSIE
project was to evaluate candidate algorithms and produce a list of recommended algo-
rithms (the NESSIE portfolio). The goal of the project was to help strengthen the 
position of European industry in cryptography, as well as that of European research
capabilities. According to Preneel et al. (2004), it was intended that the results of the
NESSIE projects would be used as input material to various standardization activities
to build consensus for the standardization of cryptographic algorithms. In fact, the
achievements discussed here as NESSIE-recommended ciphers were provided to the
standardization activities in ISO/IEC and IETF. Cryptographers from European uni-
versities and security companies took the lead in NESSIE evaluations, comprehensively
assessing security, implementation performance, and handling of intellectual property
rights, and finally selecting the recommended algorithms listed in Table 9. NESSIE
itself was dissolved after the compilation of the final report in March 2003.
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30. KEM is a cryptographic mechanism based on asymmetric ciphers for the purpose of transmission of session keys
used for symmetric ciphers. The KEM encryption process, which is performed by the sender, takes the receiver’s 
public key and certain parameters as input to the encryption function and outputs a session key K and data C
required for obtaining K. The sender transmits C to the receiver and secretly stores K at the same time. The
decryption process, which is performed by the receiver, takes the receiver’s secret key andC as inputs to the decryp-
tion function and outputs K. As a result, K can be shared between the sender and the receiver. If the receiver 
cannot obtain the correct keyK, dataC is automatically destroyed.
31. DEM is a cryptographic mechanism based on symmetric cryptographic techniques that protects both confiden-
tiality and integrity. DEM is provably secure under an assumption that a symmetric cipher adopted satisfies certain
security characteristics. ISO/IEC 18033-2 specifies a mechanism that combines DEM with an asymmetric cipher
implementing KEM (the KEM-DEM construction). In this case, the entire mechanism based on the KEM-DEM
construction is also provably secure.NESSIE recommendations specify RSA-PSS (primary recommendation) and
ECDSA (secondary recommendation) as the digital signature schemes. They specify
PSEC-KEM (primary recommendation) and RSA-KEM (secondary recommendation)
as the encryption schemes. The key lengths are specified in such a way to ensure an 
adequate security level over the medium term (five to 10 years). Key lengths of 1536
bits or longer are recommended for RSA based schemes. Key lengths of 160 bits or
longer are recommended for ECDSA and PSEC-KEM, elliptic curve cryptosystems.
Addressing Year 2010 issues will require long-term security, rather than the medium-
term security assumed for NESSIE evaluations. Thus, to determine the key lengths for
the long-term security on the basis of the NESSIE evaluation results, key lengths of at
least greater than 1536 and 160 bits must be set for RSA based schemes and elliptic
curve cryptosystems, respectively.
For symmetric ciphers, MISTY1 is recommended as a 64-bit block cipher, while
AES and Camellia are recommended as 128-bit block ciphers. NESSIE does not 
recommend any stream ciphers including RC4.
Regarding hash functions, all of four recommended hash functions have hash 
values of 256 bits or longer, consistent with CRYPTREC evaluations of hash functions
in the e-Government Recommended Ciphers List.
5. Comparison of specified, approved, and recommended cryptographic 
algorithms
In the previous sections, we introduced cryptographic algorithms approved or recom-
mended by NIST, those specified in ISO/IEC 18033, and those recommended by
CRYPTREC and NESSIE. Table 10 provides an overview of these algorithms.
First, let us compare the asymmetric ciphers without bias. We see that RSA 
and ECDSA are the cryptographic algorithms approved or recommended by NIST,
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Table 9  NESSIE-Recommended Ciphers
1





























SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512, Whirlpool
5
UMAC, TTMAC, EMAC, HMAC
Notes: 1. This table provides a summary of the evaluation results in NESSIE Consortium (2003).
2. Key lengths of 1536 bits or longer are recommended to ensure medium-term security (five to
10 years).
3. Key lengths of 160 bits or longer are recommended to ensure medium-term security.
4. To ensure medium-term security, key lengths of 160 bits or longer are recommended when
using elliptic curves and key lengths of 1536 bits or longer when using finite fields.
5. The size of the hash value for Whirlpool is 512 bits.CRYPTREC, and NESSIE as a digital signature scheme. In terms of RSA, NIST 
recommends RSA specified in ANS X9.31 and PKCS#1 (version 1.5 and higher) 
with a key of 2048 bits or longer. CRYPTREC recommends both RSA-PSS and
RSASSA-PKCS1-v_5 with a key of 1024 bits or longer, while NESSIE recommends
only RSA-PSS with a key of 1536 bits or longer. In terms of ECDSA, CRYPTREC and
NESSIE recommend ECDSA with a key of 160 bits or longer, and NIST recommends
224 bits or longer. DSA is approved and recommended by NIST and CRYPTREC,
respectively. However, the recommended key lengths differ.
With regard to asymmetric ciphers for assuring confidentiality, ISO/IEC 18033-2
specifies six types of cryptographic algorithms. Among them, the e-Government
Recommended CiphersList includes RSA-OAEP, while NESSIE-recommended ciphers
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Table 10  Cryptographic Algorithms Specified, Approved, or Recommended by NIST,
CRYPTREC, NESSIE, and ISO
NIST FIPSs and e-Government NESSIE- SPs (assuming  Recommended recommended ISO/IEC 






















































































































Note: The key lengths in the table are the minimum recommended values.include PSEC-KEM, RSA-KEM, and ACE-KEM. Based on the evaluation results 
from CRYPTREC and NESSIE, no cryptographic algorithms are recommended com-
monly by both organizations. Note that NESSIE recommends only KEM schemes
which have the key agreement mechanism. Recommended key lengths for RSA 
also differ.
In terms of key agreement schemes, if we regard PSEC-KEM as a key agreement
scheme, PSEC-KEM can be found among both the NESSIE-recommended ciphers and
the e-Government Recommended Ciphers List. A 160-bit key length for PSEC-KEM 
is also the same for both the evaluation results. DH is also recommended by both NIST
and CRYPTREC.
Among symmetric 64-bit block ciphers, no cryptographic algorithms are simul-
taneously specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3, approved by NIST, and recommended by
CRYPTREC and NESSIE. However, MISTY1 is specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3 and
recommended by CRYPTREC and NESSIE. For 128-bit block ciphers, AES is speci-
fied in ISO/IEC 18033-3, approved by NIST, and recommended by both CRYPTREC
and NESSIE. Camellia is specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3 and recommended by both
CRYPTREC and NESSIE. RC4 is recommended only by CRYPTREC under the 
certain conditions.
For hash functions, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are approved by NIST
and recommended by both CRYPTREC and NESSIE.
B. Major Points of Discussion in Selecting Cryptographic Algorithms
In this subsection, we present eight major points to be discussed to select appropriate
cryptographic algorithms and key lengths.
1. How to weigh and interpret evaluation results from the various organizations
and projects
Of the evaluation results given by ISO/IEC 18033, FIPSs and SPs of NIST, 
CRYPTREC, and NESSIE, the financial institutions need to first consider which
evaluation results are regarded as being the most suitable for their IT systems. To do
so, it is important that the financial institutions remain aware of differences among
the evaluation criteria applied by these organizations and projects. When evaluating
cryptographic algorithms, NIST and NESSIE considered implementation perform-
ance as well as security; on the other hand, CRYPTREC considered not only security
but also availability at the time when the e-Government Recommended Ciphers List
was published. Given these differences in evaluation criteria, it is necessary to deter-
mine which evaluation results for cryptographic algorithms should be mainly referred
to. The financial institutions can focus on the algorithms that are specified, approved,
or recommended on the basis of the evaluation results they selected.
2. Selecting a key length if different key lengths are recommended, specified, or
approved by the organizations or projects for the same cryptographic algorithm
After selecting specific cryptographic algorithms, the financial institutions have to
determine their key lengths. It is important to consider differences of the approaches
taken by the organizations or projects. In the case of the e-Government Recommended
Ciphers List, CRYPTREC selected cryptographic algorithms based on their availability
for e-Government systems at the time when the list was released. For this reason, the
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other organizations or projects. On the other hand, NIST selects the minimum key
lengths for the use of the algorithms in various time periods such as throughout and
after 2030, as well as throughout 2010.
In principle, it is desirable to adopt the largest value among the recommended 
minimum key lengths from the viewpoint of security. However, in cases requiring the
interoperability with other financial IT systems, the key lengths in question may be 
set to the same value as those of the systems. Additionally, it may not be possible to
physically implement a desirable key length due to various conditions such as smart
card performance. When selecting the optimal key length, the financial institutions
need to consider all of these diverse factors, which depend on features of an application
to be discussed.
3. Choosing a 64-bit or 128-bit block length for symmetric ciphers
For symmetric ciphers, ISO/IEC 18033-3, NIST FIPSs/SPs, the e-Government
Recommended Ciphers List, and the NESSIE-recommended ciphers include both 
64-bit and 128-bit block ciphers. However, NIST FIPSs and the NESSIE-
recommended ciphers exclude triple DES, which is the representative 64-bit block
cipher. Thee-Government Recommended Ciphers List suggests a preference for 128-bit
block ciphers if they are available in products. Taking these into consideration, the
financial institutions should focus on 128-bit block ciphers at first. If the selection is
based on ISO/IEC 18033-3, the financial institutions should consider AES, Camellia,
and SEED as primary candidates.
Stream ciphers may achieve higher performance in encryption and decryption
operations than existing block ciphers. However, these cases are considered relatively
rare. Although ISO/IEC 18033-4 specifies MUGI and SNOW 2.0, neither NIST nor
NESSIE approves or recommends stream ciphers. Currently, methods for the security
evaluation for stream ciphers tend to be less established than for block ciphers. Where
block ciphers (for which a relatively large number of security evaluations have been
conducted and published) can be used, there is little pressing need to adopt stream
ciphers in place of block ciphers.
4. Determining the size of the hash value for hash functions
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 (hereafter referred to as SHA-2) are
approved by NIST, while SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are recommended by
CRYPTREC and NESSIE. These must be considered to arrive at the optimal choice.
Basically, it is necessary to address whether the size of the hash value is compatible
with the specifications of the corresponding IT systems.
Nevertheless, the financial institutions should keep in mind that NIST itself is
now considering whether it is appropriate to move to SHA-2. As indicated in com-
ments on the successful attack to SHA-0, NIST was planning a transition to SHA-2
for its higher levels of security, while assuming that SHA-1 would remain secure for
the foreseeable future. However, contrary to all expectations, a successful attack has
also been launched against SHA-1. This fact raised questions as to the security of
SHA-2, since its design philosophy follows the basis of that of SHA-1. It is believed
that NIST is now conducting various studies, including those exploring the need to
develop a new hash function replacing or coexisting with SHA-2.
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Government standards by 2010, the transition to SHA-2 shall appear to be necessary,
although it may be temporary. However, for the medium or long term, the financial
institutions must keep in mind the possibility of the addition of or the transition to
new hash functions other than SHA-2.
5. Considering performance aspects such as processing time in encryption and
decryption operations when selecting the cryptographic algorithms
Let us suppose that cryptographic algorithms are needed to run on processors with 
relatively low computational power such as smart cards in a certain system and that
their user requires to balance security with processing time in encryption and decryp-
tion operations. Under such a circumstance, from those that can provide approximately
the same security levels, the user would select cryptographic algorithms that meet 
specific requirements on the implementation performance. Thus, it is necessary to
determine in advance the implementation requirements by taking into consideration
the objective system since the content of such requirements generally depends on 
features of the application.
The following may be also one discussion point when discussing how to implement
asymmetric ciphers.
6. Determining whether or not to adopt KEM-DEM construction for an 
asymmetric cipher
With regard to asymmetric ciphers, ISO/IEC 18033-2, the e-Government Recommended
Ciphers List, and the NESSIE-recommended ciphers include KEM as the recom-
mended algorithms for the key agreement purpose. Especially, ISO/IEC 18033-2 
specifies the use of KEM in the form of “KEM-DEM construction,” which combines
KEM with DEM. This is the case of those included in the e-Government Recommended
Ciphers List by CRYPTREC.
Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms for key agreement have been discussed 
differently from those for confidentiality or integrity. However, it is currently possible
to design and develop hybrid schemes, which can be used not only for key agreement
but also for confidentiality or integrity by adopting the KEM-DEM construction.
Since the KEM-DEM construction has been recommended in ISO/IEC 18033-2, the
NESSIE-recommended ciphers, and the e-Government Recommended Ciphers List,
the construction may be deployed in various scenes in the coming years. Therefore, it
may be beneficial for the financial institutions to consider the possibility of adopting
the KEM-DEM construction as an alternative.
In applications involving asymmetric ciphers applied to ensure confidentiality, 
it may be relatively easy to introduce the KEM construction, since asymmetric ciphers
are generally used to distribute session keys for symmetric ciphers. However, imple-
menting the ciphers in the KEM-DEM construction may require additional system
modifications. This is because the approach differs from the conventional use of
asymmetric ciphers and symmetric ciphers. The deployment of the KEM-DEM 
construction may require the system modifications to the other financial institutions.
All of these points are important and are needed to be confirmed when the financial
institutions consider to adopt the KEM-DEM construction.
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The three following points require attention in revising specifications for IT systems
associated with the transitions to new cryptographic algorithms.
1. When changing the specifications of cryptographic algorithms, ensure that
such changes will not impair the interoperability for the IT system in question
and other related systems
In many cases, financial institutions’ IT systems are linked to other systems. For
instance, if a bank changes the cryptographic algorithm used in its ATM network 
system and updates its IC cash card and ATM specifications, the IC cash cards may no
longer work in ATMs operated by other banks, or the ATMs of the bank in question
may not accept IC cash cards issued by the other banks.
To prevent such problems, the financial institutions must discuss impacts of mod-
ifying specifications of their IT systems on other related systems in the transition of
cryptographic algorithms. In some cases, it may be necessary to consider separating
the cryptographic algorithms in different IT systems. Additionally, with respect to 
the effects on other financial institutions, the financial institutions must consider 
in advance how to minimize potential damage—for instance, by coordinating the
contents and timing of system modifications with other banks carefully.
2. Revise configurations to ensure appropriate use of the new cryptographic
algorithms and to prohibit use of the old algorithms
Even if a financial institution introduces a new cryptographic algorithm at significant
cost in response to Year 2010 issues, the measure will have little benefit if problems
with the corresponding IT system lead to continued use of the old, insecure crypto-
graphic algorithm. Such circumstances may arise with Internet banking systems. For
instance, it is considered that inappropriate SSL server settings may permit to use not
only symmetric ciphers with a 128-bit key, but also those with a 40-bit or 56-bit key.
Eliminating the possibility of such problems requires configuring appropriate settings
on the server to disable communications based on the old, insecure ciphers, in addi-
tion to moving to and enabling the new cryptographic algorithms. Such attention is
required not just for Internet banking systems, but also for all information systems
affected by the transition to the new cryptographic algorithms.
The following is also important although it may be security practice in general.
3. Do not share cryptographic keys when circumstances require the use of two
or more cryptographic algorithms, even if the algorithms are the same class 
of cryptographic techniques
In certain cases, as in point 1 above, two or more separate cryptographic algorithms
must be used to ensure the interoperability with other related systems. For instance,
the following situation is assumed: while cryptographic algorithms are revised based
on ISO/IEC 18033-3 to AES, Camellia, or SEED in the part of a system used within
a bank, triple DES continues to be used in the part of the system open to other banks
to maintain the interoperability.
In such cases, if the same cryptographic key is adopted both in the parts of the system,
security levels depend on the weaker algorithm (in this case, triple DES). As a result,
an effect of moving to a more secure algorithm is lost. Even if cryptographic techniques
are the same, sharing the keys raises significant security issues and should be avoided.
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In Year 2010 issues, the deadline by which the issues must be addressed is quite clear,
because NIST has already disclosed a point in time by which the security guarantees
will no longer hold. Although the likelihood may remain extremely low, even crypto-
graphic algorithms that have been evaluated as providing adequate security may be
found vulnerable to unanticipated advances in cryptanalytic techniques. Users of
cryptographic algorithms must remain aware of the possibility of sudden compro-
mises. It is desirable for not only each financial institution but also the financial
industry as a whole to establish systems to deal with the future compromise of crypto-
graphic algorithms appropriately by making use of the discussion on Year 2010 issues.
With respect to the establishment of such systems, the following two issues should
be addressed before all others.
1. Establish systems to keep current with the security evaluations of 
cryptographic algorithms and actions of other organizations and projects
such as NIST, CRYPTREC, NESSIE, and ISO
When it remains unclear whether security guarantees for cryptographic algorithms
will be lost, the financial institutions must decide on their own when they should
move to new cryptographic algorithms. To aid such a decision, it is necessary to 
monitor the security evaluation results for cryptographic algorithms already published
and continuously examine prospects for security based on information released by 
the evaluation organizations such as NIST. The security evaluation of cryptographic
algorithms requires profound expertise. It is not easy for the financial institutions 
to establish such systems within a short timeframe. Nevertheless, since the financial
institutions have significant responsibility for assuring the security of their IT systems,
which have a highly public aspect, the financial institutions are required to address
such issues steadily and proactively.
The financial institutions would have to perform their own security evaluations if
they adopted cryptographic algorithms, which were not approved or recommended by
the third parties such as ISO, NIST, CRYPTREC, and NESSIE.
In the future, the financial institutions may also begin using services such as digital
time stamps. In such a case, the financial institutions would be required to pay atten-
tion to the cryptographic algorithms used for these services. Digital time stamps are
one possible means for ensuring integrity and other characteristics of digital data in
the medium to long term, and one presumes that the cryptographic algorithms used
in association with time stamps will provide medium- to long-term security. In this
area as well, the financial institutions should establish systems for performing their
own security evaluations of cryptographic algorithms.
2. Study how to design and develop IT systems that can smoothly accommodate
changes in cryptographic algorithms and in key lengths
One way of smoothly dealing with the threat of compromise of cryptographic algo-
rithms is to design and develop IT systems that can easily accommodate changes in
cryptographic algorithms and key lengths. Examples include the use of cryptographic
modules that allow easy replacement and/or communication formats that allow
changes in key lengths and ciphertext sizes.
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also implement in advance two or more cryptographic algorithms with different 
security characteristics such that it is easy to switch one algorithm to another one. As a
result, even if one of the algorithms is compromised, the other will continue to provide
adequate security without any losses due to the migration of the algorithms, helping to
ensure the security level of the IT system as a whole.
Other measures to anticipate compromise of cryptographic algorithms include
development of IT systems based on unconditional security, rather than computational
security. The unconditional security is a security characteristic that, as long as an
attacker cannot obtain a certain amount of information, the security level can be main-
tained independently on the computational power of the attacker. It may be beneficial
to follow the research results of this technique. In addition, research results of various
cryptographic techniques based on quantum mechanics may also be beneficial.
VI. Summary
Year 2010 issues pose potential significant issues for financial institutions using the 
conventional cryptographic algorithms such as two-key triple DES, 1024-bit RSA, 
and SHA-1. The financial industry has traditionally relied on cryptographic algo-
rithms guaranteed by NIST (FIPS approval) and has made use of such guarantees 
as important benchmarks in selecting cryptographic algorithms. By selecting crypto-
graphic algorithms based on NIST decisions, financial institutions have been able to
justify their selection of cryptographic algorithms to their customers and other related
parties in terms of security and reliability. Taking into account these experiences to
date, financial institutions should understand the background of NIST decisions and
examine appropriate response to Year 2010 issues in the future.
Compared to the late 1970s, when DES proliferated in the private sector after NIST
selection of DES as an FIPS-approved cipher, a wide range of cryptographic algorithms
and options is now available. Financial institutions can select from cryptographic 
algorithms objectively recommended by various cryptographers and organizations. 
For instance, we can refer to cryptographic algorithms specified in ISO/IEC 18033, the
CRYPTREC e-Government Recommended Ciphers List, and NESSIE-recommended
ciphers are included in addition to NIST’s FIPS-approved ciphers. The cryptographic
algorithms each differ in terms of security properties, algorithm structures, and imple-
mentation performance. It is necessary for financial institutions to understand these
characteristics when considering which cryptographic algorithms should be adopted.
When selecting cryptographic algorithms, financial institutions should also 
consider the compatibility of the algorithms with their current applications. They
should consider how to manage such a transition to minimize disruptions or damage
to the existing systems and to customer convenience. In addition, the financial 
institutions should take care to prevent continuing use of weak algorithms used before
the transition. Year 2010 issues can also be understood as an opportunity to consider
appropriate measures to prevent and respond to compromise of cryptographic 
algorithms. Ideally, studies should be undertaken to anticipate potential breaches of
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graphic algorithms and the actions of NIST and other evaluation organizations and
projects will be vital.
As shown in the previous section, there are many points to be discussed with
regard to Year 2010 issues. There is relatively little time before 2010 for such work,
and it is expected that the financial institutions will respond rapidly to Year 2010
issues in the coming years.
161
Year 2010 Issues on Cryptographic AlgorithmsBlake-Wilson, S., M. Nystrom, D. Hopwood, J. Mikkelsen, and T. Wright, RFC 3546: Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Extensions, 2003.
———, ———, ———, ———, and ———, IETF Internet Draft: Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions, 2005.
Brent, R., “Recent Progress and Prospects for Integer Factorization Algorithms,” Proceedings of COCOON
2000, LNCS 1858, Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 3–20.
Certicom Research, SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 1.0, 2000.
Coppersmith, D., “Fast Evaluation of Logarithms in Fields of Characteristic Two,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, 30 (4), 1984, pp. 587–594.
Dierks, T., and C. Allen, RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0, 1999.
———, and E. Rescorla, IETF Internet Draft: The TLS Protocol, Version 1.1, 2005.
ElGamal, T., “A Subexponential-Time Algorithm for Computing Discrete Logarithms over GF(p
2),”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 31 (4), 1985, pp. 473–481.
EMVco, EMV Integrated Circuit Card Specifications for Payments Systems Version 4.1, Book 2: Security
and Key Management, 2004.
———, EMV Issuer and Application Security Guidelines, Version 1.3, 2005.
European Committee for Standardization and Information Society Standardization System (CEN/ISSS),
Pr CWA 14174-3: Financial Transactional IC Card Reader (FINREAD)—Part 3: Security
Requirements, 2002. 
Fluhrer, S., I. Mantin, and A. Shamir, “Attacks on RC4 and WEP,”CryptoBytes, 5 (2), 2002 (available at
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/cryptobytes/index.html).
Franke, J., T. Kleinjung, C. Paar, J. Pelzl, C. Priplata, and C. Stahlke, “SHARK: A Realizable Special
Hardware Sieving Device for Factoring 1024-Bit Integers,” Proceedings of CHES 2005, LNCS
3659, Springer-Verlag, 2005, pp. 119–130.
Frey, G., and H.-G. Rück, “A Remark Concerning m-Divisibility and the Discrete Logarithm in the
Divisor Class Group of Curve,” Mathematics of Computation, 62 (206), 1994, pp. 865–874.
Geiselmann, W., A. Shamir, R. Steinwandt, and E. Tromer, “Scalable Hardware for Sparse Systems of
Linear Equations with Applications to Integer Factorization,” Proceedings of CHES 2005, LNCS
3659, Springer-Verlag, 2005, pp. 131–146.
Gordon, D., “Discrete Logarithms in GF(p) Using the Number Field Sieve,” SIAM Journal on Discrete
Mathematics, 6, 1993, pp. 124–138.
Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan (IPA), and Telecommunications Advancement
Organization of Japan (TAO), CRYPTREC Report 2002, March, 2003.
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), ISO 11568-4: Banking—Key Management
(Retail)—Part 4: Key Management Techniques Using Public Key Cryptography, 1998a.
———, ISO/TR 13569: Banking and Related Financial Services—Information Security Guidelines,
Amendment 1, 1998b.
———, ISO 9564-1: Banking—Personal Identification—Number Management and Security—Part 1:
Basic Principles and Requirements for Online PIN Handling in ATM and POS Systems, 2002a.
———, ISO/TR 17944: Banking—Security and Other Financial Services—Framework for Security in
Financial Systems, 2002b.
———, ISO 9564-2: Banking—Personal Identification—Number Management and Security—Part 2:
Approved Algorithms for PIN Encipherment, 2005a.
———, ISO 11568-2: Banking—Key Management (Retail)—Part 2: Key Management Techniques for
Symmetric Ciphers, 2005b.
———, and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), ISO/IEC 10118-3: Information
Technology—Security Techniques—Hash Functions—Part 3: Dedicated Hash Functions, 2004.
———, and ———, ISO/IEC 18033-2: Information Technology—Security Techniques—Encryption
Algorithms—Part 2: Asymmetric Ciphers, 2005a.
———, and ———, ISO/IEC 18033-3: Information Technology—Security Techniques—Encryption
Algorithms—Part 3: Block Ciphers, 2005b.
162 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MARCH 2007
References———, and ———, ISO/IEC 18033-4: Information Technology—Security Techniques—Encryption
Algorithms—Part 4: Stream Ciphers, 2005c.
Japanese Bankers Association (JBA), Zenginkyo IC Cash Card Hyojun Shiyo (Standard Specifications of
IC Cash Cards), 2006 (in Japanese).
Kaliski, B., TWIRL and RSA Key Size, 2003 (available at http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id
=2004).
Kusuda, K., and T. Matsumoto, “A Strength Evaluation of the Data Encryption Standard,” IMES
Discussion Paper No. 97-E-5, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 1997. 
Lenstra, A. K., and E. R. Verheul, “Selecting Cryptographic Key Size,” Journal of Cryptology, 14 (4),
2001, pp. 255–293.
———, X. Wang, and B. de Weger, “Colliding X.509 Certificates,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2005
(available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/067).
Lucks, S., and M. Daum, “The Story of Alice and Her Boss: Hash Functions and the Blind Passenger
Attack,” Presentation at Rump Sessions of Eurocrypt 2005, 2005.
Menezes, A. J., T. Okamoto, and S. A. Vanstone, “Reducing Elliptic Curve Logarithms to Logarithms in
a Finite Field,” Proceedings of the 23rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1991,
pp. 80–89.
Merkle, R., and M. Hellman, “On the Security of Multiple Encryption,” Communication of ACM, 24
(7), 1981, pp. 465–467.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
e-Government Recommended Ciphers List, February 20, 2003 (available at http://www.cryptrec.
jp/images/cryptrec_01.pdf).
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), NIST Brief Comments on Recent Cryptanalytic
Attacks on Secure Hashing Functions and the Continued Security Provided by SHA-1, 2004a
(available at http://csrc.nist.gov/NIST%20Brief%20Comments%20on%20Hash%20Standards
%208-25-2004.pdf).
———, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, SP800-67,
2004b.
———, Recommendation on Key Management, SP800-57, 2005a (available at http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/nistpubs/800-57/SP800-57-Part1.pdf).
———, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification, SP800-78, 2005b
(available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-78/sp800-78-final.pdf).
———, Personal Identity Verification of Federal Employees and Contractors, FIPS 201, 2005c (available
at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips201/FIPS-201-022505.pdf).
———, NIST Brief Comments on Recent Cryptanalytic Attacks on SHA-1, 2005d (available at http://
csrc.nist.gov/news-highlights/NIST-Brief-Comments-on-SHA1-attack.pdf).
———, Draft Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-3—Digital Signature Standard
(DSS), 2006a.
———, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography,
SP800-56A, draft, March, 2006b.
New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption (NESSIE) Consortium, Portfolio of
Recommended Cryptographic Primitives, 2003 (available at https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/
nessie/deliverables/decision-final.pdf).
Pomerance, C., “Fast, Rigorous Factorization and Discrete Logarithm Algorithms,” in D. S. Johnson, T.
Nishizeki, A. Nozaki, and H. S. Wilf, eds. Discrete Algorithms and Complexity, Academic Press,
1987, pp. 119–143.
Preneel, B., A. Biryukov, C. De Cannière, S. B. Örs, E. Oswald, B. Van Rompay, L. Granboulan, E.
Dottax, G. Martinet, S. Murphy, A. Dent, R. Shipsey, C. Swart, J. White, M. Dichtl, S. Pyka,
M. Schafheutle, P. Serf, E. Biham, E. Barkan, Y. Braziler, O. Dunkelman, V. Furman, D.
Kenigsberg, J. Stolin, J.-J. Quisquater, M. Ciet, F. Sica, H. Raddum, L. Knudsen, and M. Parker,
Final Report of European Project Number IST-1999-12324, Named New European Schemes for
Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption, Version 0.15 (beta), 2004.
163
Year 2010 Issues on Cryptographic AlgorithmsSato, T., and K. Araki, “Fermat Quotients and the Polynomial Time Discrete Log Algorithm for Anomalous
Elliptic Curves,” Commentarii Mathematici Universitatis Sancti Pauli, 47 (1), 1998, pp. 81–92.
Schirokauer, O., “Discrete Logarithms and Local Units,” Journal of Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society of London, Series A, 345, 1993, pp. 409–423.
———, D. Weber, and T. Denny, “Discrete Logarithms: The Effectiveness of the Index Calculus
Method,” Algorithmic Number Theory, LNCS 1122, Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp. 335–361.
SWIFT, “Secure Card Reader Upgrade Coming Up,” SWIFT Bulletin, 13, 2000, pp. 1–2.
Taniguchi, F., K. Ohta, and M. Ohkubo, “Triple DES wo Meguru Saikin no Hyojunka Doko ni tsuite
(Recent Standardization Trend around Triple DES),” Kin’yu Kenkyu (Monetary and Economic
Studies), 18 (S-1), Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 1999, pp.
29–50 (in Japanese).
Thomé, E., Discrete Logarithms in GF(2ˆ607), 2002 (available at http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/Labo/
Emmanuel.Thome/announcement/announcement.html).
Wang, X., “Cryptanalysis for Hash Functions and Some Potential Dangers,” RSA Conference 2006
Cryptographer’s Track, 2006.
———, A. Yao, and F. Yao, “New Collision Search for SHA-1,”Presentation of Rump Session of CRYPTO
2005, 2005 (available at http://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2005/r/2.pdf).
———,Y. L. Yin, and H. Yu, “Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1,” Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO
2005, LNCS 3621, Springer-Verlag, 2005, pp.17–36 (available at http://www.infosec.sdu.edu.
cn/paper/sha1-crypto-auth-new-2-yao.pdf).
Yoshida, M., K. Kobara, and H. Imai, “Verification of WEP Implementation in Latest Products,”
Proceedings of 28th International Symposium on Information Theory and Applications (ISITA’05),
2005.
164 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MARCH 2007